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1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
The Smart Grid is a Cyber Physical system which relies on the interaction between com-
plex Information Technology (IT) networks and Operational Technology (OT) networks. In
the Smart Grid, control and monitoring of physical devices is facilitated through the SCADA
network. Recent attacks, such at the Ukrainian Power Grid Attack, show a rising trend of
sophisticated and persistent attackers targeting the static vulnerabilities of power systems
and SCADA networks [2].
While SCADA networks are secured with traditional security devices like firewalls and
intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), vulnerabilities persist. For example, an
IPS can create a firewall rule to block traffic coming from an attacker who is attempting
to flood a SCADA system and create a Denial of Service (DoS). The attacker can bypass
this security measure by spoofing the IP address of a trusted or whitelisted machine. For a
power system to function properly, there must be timely communication over SCADA net-
works. A loss of communication could result in major consequences that have the potential
for cascading effects such as major blackouts. For this reason, any security measures im-
plemented in a power system must be tested thoroughly to ensure SCADA communication
is within an acceptable threshold.
A moving target defenses (MTD) attempts to address the security issues caused by the
static nature of SCADA systems. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, port numbers, operat-
ing systems, and application software usually remain constant during network operations.
2This allows attackers the ability to accurately and easily footprint networks. An accurate
footprint is needed to understand the attack surface of the system. An MTD continuously
changes the static variables over to some time interval. This creates complexity for the
attacker and it makes footprinting a costly activity. Additionally, it provides only a brief
window for an attacker to execute a particular exploit.
This paper proposes a novel MTD for SCADA networks using an IP-Hopping algorithm
to mutate the source and destination IP addresses of an IP packet as it is sent from one
gateway router and then received by another gateway router. Since the MTD is imple-
mented at the gateway routers of a SCADA system, the service is transparent to any end
systems. This reduces computational overhead at the end systems and requires absolutely
no configuration changes to individual hosts on a subnet.
This MTD method prevents attacks targeting internal networks because the IP addresses
of the packets sent between the gateways appear random. These IP addresses change ran-
domly and dynamically giving an attacker viewing this traffic the impression there is an
immense number of hosts behind each gateway. Additionally, footprinting becomes a chal-
lenge as hosts will seem to go off-line as the IP addresses change. Therefore, this method
prevents attackers from targeting resources on a SCADA network as well as reducing un-
wanted traffic to any particular end device.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review and analysis of
design choices in related MTD research and implementations. Section 3 briefly describes the
architecture of the SCADA network on the Iowa State University PowerCyber Testbed used
to test the MTD; it also details the attack characteristics of the MTD algorithm. Section
4 describes benefits of our method and describes the functionality of the MTD algorithm.
Section 5 presents our experimental results using our MTD method on the architecture de-
3scribed in section 3. This section also analyzes the effectiveness of previous works. Section
6 analyzes performance characteristics of our MTD method to the MTD methods described
in section 2. Section 7 provides a conclusion to the paper and discusses opportunities for
future research.
4CHAPTER 2. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RELATED WORK
There is a growing interest and a vast array of research regarding MTD at the govern-
ment, academic, and industry levels [14] [1] [2]. MTD can be applied to any layer of the
OSI model. This section will mainly focus on research involving MTD at the network layer.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of the largest government support-
ers of MTD research [14]. The DHS Cyber Security Division funds several MTD projects.
They do this through support of their prime performers to include, Florida Institute of
Technology, Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, Def-Logix, IBM,
and Princeton University.
Researchers from the Argus Cyber Security Lab at the University of South Florida,
supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research released a product called Ancor [4].
Ancor is a cloud automation framework that creates an application layer MTD by changing
the dependencies between various layers of the application stack. Network layer MTD using
port and address hopping have been proposed in [5].
An MTD using the IPv6 address space is proposed in [9] and [10]. IPv6 uses a 128
bit address space, providing vast amounts of entropy necessary for an effective MTD. The
model used by these sources is closer to a traditional IT environment, making them less
useful for drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of an MTD in a SCADA environment.
5Several papers have been published on developing Software Defined Networks (SDNs) to
implement an MTD. Wang et al. [6] used SDNs in his proposal for MOTAG, an MTD algo-
rithm to prevent Internet scale Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attacks. Kampanakis
et al. [7] implemented an SDN-based MTD using Cisco’s One Platform Kit and showed its
ability to prevent TCP host discovery and Operating System (OS) fingerprinting. Jafarian
et al. [8] used an SDN Open Flow controller to implement an OpenFlow Random Host
Mutation (OF-RHM) IP address randomization scheme, taking advantage of virtual IPs.
2.1 Fingerprint Hopping
In [22] Zhao et al. proposed an SDN-based fingerprint hopping MTD with the goal
of preventing fingerprinting attacks.The goal of this MTD is to prevent Operating System
(OS) detection from active and passive scanning tools. Knowing the version and OS of
a system could allow attackers to launch scripted attacks. This information is especially
valuable if the OS version shows the system is missing critical security patches.
Fingerprint hopping is achieved by changing several parameters used for OS detection
in open-source and commercial scanning tools such as Nessus and Nmap [12]. This includes
values like the TCP initial sequence number, the TCP window size and the time to live
value of IP packets. This implementation randomly assigns these values to packets in the
network to create an effective MTD. It accomplishes this through OpenFlow SDN rules
controlled by the open source POX controller.
Figure 1 is a diagram showing the components of the fingerprint hopping MTD. These
include the SDN controller, an IDS and the fingerprint hopping engine. The blue line is the
path taken by trusted data. The red line is the traffic flow of untrusted data subjected to
the MTD.
6Figure 2.1 Network diagram showing the components of Fingerpring Hopping MTD
All data flows through the IDS. If an inbound packet is determined to be a fingerprinting
attempt the IDS contacts the POX controller. The controller is responsible for all routing
decisions on the network. It accomplishes this by pushing flow tables to the switches on the
network. When the controller receives suspicious inbound traffic from the IDS it creates and
tags a normal outbound packet to send to the attacker. It then sends the tagged packets
to the Fingerprint Hopping Engine (FHE). The FHE receives the tagged outbound packet
and randomly applies a new fingerprint to the packet from a database of false fingerprints.
The controller then creates and pushes the appropriate flow to forward the modified packet
to the appropriate outbound stream.
The fingerprint hopping MTD implementation succeeds in its goal of preventing OS
footprinting attacks. The selective filtering of traffic using an IDS helps to improve perfor-
mance in terms of latency and overhead since all network traffic is not obfuscated by the
FHE. The problem with this approach is the assumption the IDS will catch all suspicious
traffic. This is a weak adversarial model. Every IDS has some false negative rate meaning
7some amount of fingerprinting traffic will not be detected. This is escpecially the case for
traffic which has no fingerprint in the IDS database. In this case, the MTD will not be
applied to the malicious traffic. This makes the MTD only as effective as the IDS.
2.2 CHAOS SDN
In [20] Shi et al. introduced an SDN-based MTD which utilizes decoy servers, port
hopping and IP address hopping. This MTD provides security by preventing the targeting
of hosts in a network. Additionally, the use of decoy servers provides defenders extra time
to respond to an attack while also recording the attackers actions. This can be useful for
forensically understadnding an attack.
Figure 2.2 Network diagram displaying the components of the CHAOS MTD
The CHAOS MTD consists of several components. These include the CHAOS obfusca-
tion module, the CHAOS tower module and the bro IDS. The components can be clearly
identified in figure 2. All network trafic flows through the bro engine before it is passed to
the tower module. Certain traffic will be chosen for obfuscation while benign traffic will be
8unchanged.
The CHAOS MTD if implemented on Open vSwitch using the OpenFlow protocol and
the Floodlight controller. The most unique component of this implementation is the tower
module. The tower module is implemented completely within the scripting language of the
Floodlight controller. It is a data structure which groups all hosts on the network into
security groups by CVSS risk scores. Each security group is put into a priority layer and
assigned a weight value by an administrator. The CHAOS tower defines a set of rules which
determine the allowed communciation between groups and layers. Any attempted commu-
nication which does not fall into these rules is marked as an unexpected communication.
The operation of the CHAOS MTD is straight forward. All traffic is first monitored
by the IDS. Any traffic fitting a fingerprint is sent directly to the obfuscation module.
Benign traffic is sent to the tower module. If the tower module determines traffic to be
unexpected, then this traffic is also sent to the obfuscation module. An index score set
by the administrator, based on the security policies in the tower module, determines the
amount of obfuscation which occurs. For example, if the index score is low, only IP address
obfuscation will be applied. If the index passes an administrator set threshold, then port
obfuscation will be applied and traffic may be redirected to a decoy server. After traffic
is obfuscated with random values, the proper flows are created by the controller to ensure
routability of the obfuscated traffic.
The experimentns in this paper showed low latency and overhead of MTD traffic. It
is speculated this is due to the selective application of the MTD to only suspicious traffic.
This method was also shown to be effective at reducing but not eliminating footrprinting
and DoS attempts.
9Again, a weak adversarial model was chosen. The tower module does help to prevent
false negatives from the IDS. However there must be a false negative rate based upon the
selection rules and security groups chosen for the tower module. This means the MTD is
only as effective as the false positive rate of the detection system. Additionally, as the net-
work begins to scale the management of the security groups and rules in the tower module
will increase. This could case severe maintenacne overhead and cost.
2.3 RPAH - Random Port and Address Hopping
In [18] Luo et al. implemented an MTD making use of port and IP address hopping.
This is a routable MTD which does not rely on an SDN and is instead implemented as a
series of hosts within a network. It is capable of providing IP address and port obfuscation
and is shown to effectively hide hosts.
Figure 2.3 Network diagram showing the components of the RPAH MTD
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Figure 3 shows the components of the RPAH MTD. They include the Client Hopping
Gateway (HGc), the Server Hopping Gateway (HGs) and the Port Hopping Engine (PHE).
The HGc works by first authenticating hosts over PKI. This ensures they are a valid mem-
ber of the MTD. The HGc uses the priave key in conjuction with the known real IP of the
server, a timestamp, and the clients virtual IP to calculate the virtual IP of the server. It
uses a similar process to determine the virtual port numbers for the server. After determin-
ing these values, the HGc obfuscates the real source and destination IP of an egress packet
and replaces them with the virtual values. Using the same, information the HGc is able to
deobfuscate ingress packets and forward them to the appropriate host.
The HGs performs the same functions as the HGc however it does not obfuscate or de-
obfuscate port values for ingress and egress packets. Instead, the PHE located on the server
performs this function. These functions are seperated because if the destination address of
a deobfuscated ingress packet is not in the subnet of the server, then it is invalid and the
server does not need to process the packet.
As an added security measure, each component keeps a hash chain table. This is used
to easily determine if incoming packets are valid by only doing a look up. This means the
virtual IP address and port values could be calculated based on the PKI key values.
This MTD is unique because the various gateways do not need to communicate with one
another once they have established PKI and an initial time value. This is made possible by
the mathematical hash funcitons which generate the virtual IP addresses and port numbers.
The drawbacks of this method are the possible administrative overhead of managing
PKI as this method scales. Several components must be implemented for each broadcast
domain. This increases cost.
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2.4 Gateway Proxy Hopping
Previous work on MTD at the network layer of the OSI model has been conducted at
the Iowa State University PowerCyber testbed for target cyber-attacks by Pappa, et al. [3].
Their method dynamically mutates the IP addresses of the external interfaces of SCADA
gateways. This method consists of few componenets and produces low overhead.
Figure 2.4 SCADA diagram for Gateway Proxy Hopping
Figure 4 shows the experimental setup used by Pappa. The MTD is implemented using
proxy rules in the Linux OS. The MTD is straight forward. A seed value is shared from
one gateway to the other. The value is used to generate a random list of IP addresses for
both gateways. The proxy rules are then updated to change the IP address of the interface
on the gateway. After each IP hop, a TCP connection is opened and closed to ensure the
12
hops are synchronized.
Their tests on a realistic SCADA network showed that availability of SCADA systems
could be maintained with a minimum four second hopping interval. This method does not
hide the IP addresses of hosts behind these gateways. It does prevent targeting of the
gateways themselves. However, An attacker who can intercept packets between these two
gateways can build an accurate picture of the devices behind the gateways.
Our MTD method builds off of this work to create a defense-in-depth solution, obscuring
the hosts in a particular SCADA subnet. The remainder of this paper describes how this
can be accomplished.
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CHAPTER 3. ARCHITECTURE AND ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS
3.1 MTD Testbed Architecture
Figure 5 depicts the architecture used for analysis of the MTD described in this paper.
The test network was implemented in the Iowa State University PowerCyber testbed [15].
The network consists of the two gateway routers that facilitate communication between a
substation and a control center. The control center consists of one SCADA server set to
passively monitor and control the relay located on the substation network. An attacker is
present and is capable of monitoring traffic and sending traffic between both gateways on
the Wide Area Network (WAN).
Figure 3.1 Network diagram of experimental setup
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The substation relay is the only physical device in this setup. The gateways, the attacker
and the SCADA server are virtual machines implemented in VMware. All virtual commu-
nication is sent over virtual networks using a 10 gigabit per second (10Gbit) interfaces. The
physical relay is connected to the virtual substation network by bridging the relay’s NIC to
the substation virtual network.
As stated, the attacker is capable of monitoring traffic and carrying out a Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attack. Normally, the attacker would monitor network traffic sent between
the gateways which act as routers. If they can perform reconnaissance and successfully
footprint the network, then from their position, they can easily exploit any vulnerabilities
they may find.
3.2 Attack Characteristics
Prevalent security devices like firewalls and IDS/IPS system would have difficulty stop-
ping an attacker in this situation because they rely on known information such as attack
signatures and static IP addresses. A successful reconnaissance needed for an attack be-
comes far more difficult when an MTD is run in conjunction with these traditional security
devices. This is because an attacker is given a small window of time to find an active IP
address that can be attacked.
The defensive value of an MTD implementation values greatly, and is difficult to evaluate
experimentally. MTD, as part of a defense-in-depth strategy seeks not to directly prevent
attack execution, but raise attack cost due to increased complexity in reconnaissance and
target discovery. Put simply, the objective is to confuse the attacker. As such, it has no
easily-tested metrics, but the paper by Pappa, et al. does propose a model for a maximum
probability of attack success. This was done by designating the time between MTD hops
15
as an attack window, and calculating the probability of successfully discovering the target
during this window. Further assumptions include no attack cost beyond target discovery,
and that any host reconnaissance information expires and becomes useless once the MTD
cycles to a new set of addresses [1]. The MTD implementation presented in this paper has
defensive behavior similar to the implementation described in that paper.
To discover an active IP and create a footprint, the attacker must scan for active network
hosts on a subnet using a host discovery tool such as Nmap. It took an average of 25 ms to
scan and discover a single active host on our network. On average, it takes approximately
6.47s to scan an entire range of hosts on a subnet with 254 host IP addresses. The lowest
hopping interval we tested was one second. These two values can be considered a lower and
an upper bound.
The worst case scenario for an attack is when an attacker begins their scan at the same
time that a new MTD IP address is initiated. While this is purely theoretical mapping, it is
intuitive the probability of a successful attack is reduced as the time interval of the MTD is
reduced. Taking the previously mentioned upper and lower bounds into consideration, the
probability of a successful attack would increase linearly between these bounds. Again, in
this case, a successful attack is when an attacker discovers an active MTD IP address. Once
they have this information they can attempt an additional attack further down the cyber
kill-chain. However, due to the nature of the MTD they will only have a brief moment to
carry out a follow up attack such as vulnerability scanning, OS detection, or a replay attack.
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CHAPTER 4. MTD THEORY OF OPERATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Theory of Operation
Previous network layer MTDs have utilized IP-hopping at the gateway interface level
[1]. This MTD method provides security benefits by preventing attackers from targeting
the gateway interfaces directly. However, on publicly routed SCADA traffic, such as in our
scenario, this method is ineffective. If an attacker can intercept packets between the two
gateways, then they have access to the IP addresses of the systems behind the gateways.
With this information, attackers can still target the critical SCADA devices in a subnet.
Figure 4.1 The flow of a packet in a gateway interface MTD
Figures 5-6 show the various IP addresses of packets sent from the substation (SS) WAN
gateway to the control center (CC) WAN gateway both without (Fig. 5) and with (Fig 6.)
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Figure 4.2 The flow of a packet in a NAT MTD
address transaltion MTD in effect. If an attacker were to intercept or observe this packet,
the attacker would then be equipped with the IP addresses of the devices on the SS LAN
and CC LAN. While the interfaces of the routers on the MTD WAN are performing a
network layer MTD by randomly choosing new IP addresses on a given time interval, and
traffic sent from an attacker to the CC LAN or the SS LAN will be accepted and forwarded
by either gateway.
Figure 6 demonstrates an MTD method using NAT based rules on the gateway. As a
packet is sent from the SS LAN, the source and destination IP addresses are obfuscated to
an MTD IP. The packet maintains this configuration as it moves over the MTD WAN. Once
the packet reaches the CC LAN, the source and destination IP addresses are translated back
to their original values and sent to the appropriate host. An attacker capable of sniffing
packets on the WAN can now only attempt to send traffic to the machines on the CC and
SS LANs. While the attacker does have a short window to send traffic this IP address will
quickly change confusing the attacker and dropping the session.
One point of concern to address regarding the functionality of NAT rules for an MTD
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is their default stateful nature. This is a problem if an attacker is able to gain a connection
with a host during their brief window of opportunity while the MTD IP address is constant
before switching to a new IP address. This is because stateful NAT rules will allow a con-
nection over the MTD WAN to persist even is the NAT rules on the gateway are updated.
This is not the functionality that we desire. Connections by devices outside of the CC and
SS LANs should be dropped because they are not part of the MTD network. To force this
behavior stateless NAT rules must be enforced. This way an attacker will be dropped upon
an NAT rule change.
One final design decision concerns the routability of packets after the MTD obfuscation
has been applied. This becomes a design trade-off between scaling the MTD namespace
(which increases attack cost) and minimizing the amount of configuration overhead needed
on intermediate routers. Several options can be enumerated:
• Only hop between IP addresses belonging to the same subnet as the actual host.
• Select and assign one or more MTD address ranges to each “real” subnet range.
• Select IP addresses from the IPv4 namespace as a whole.
The first and last options presented represent extremes of this trade-off. The first option
requires no additional configuration of intermediate routers, but limits the MTD names-
pace to the address space of the original subnet. For a /24 CIDR network, this is only a
namespace of 28 bits, or 216 bits for a /16 network. The third option represents the oppo-
site extreme: it provides maximum namespace and therefore the greatest increase in attack
complexity, but the packets become un-routeable unless intermediate routers coordinate
with the MTD system to decode the packets.
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The third represents a balanced medium. Each “real” address is assigned one or more
“fake” ranges as the MTD namespace. These MTD ranges need not be of the same subnet
size; for example a single /24 network may have a selection of four /16 address spaces as-
signed to it. When MTD is applied to hosts within the original /24 network, the address is
selected from any one of the corresponding /16 address spaces. This approach does require
additional configuration on intermediate routers, but very little more than is needed to con-
figure the underlying routing in the first place. Static routes for each of the MTD ranges
must be added to direct packets to the same next-hop as if they had not been obfuscated.
Since each MTD range is explicitly associated with a fixed “real” range, this configuration
is static, and there is no need for the intermediate routers to associate or synchronize with
the MTD system.
4.2 MTD Implementation
The above theory of operation requires four sets of stateless Network Address Transla-
tion (NAT) rules. As packets travel from one host to another (for example, from a Control
Center SCADA server to a remote RTU) it will undergo four transformations, two transla-
tions of the datagram’s source address (SNAT) and two of the destination (DNAT).
• SNAT from the real source address to an obfuscated source IP
• DNAT from the real destination address to an obfuscated destination IP
• DNAT from the obfuscated destination to the real destination
• SNAT from the obfuscated source to the real source
After the first two translations, the packet has been fully obfuscated according to the
MTD scheme. Following the last half, the packet has been translated back to its original
20
state.
During the packet’s transit through the network, it will pass through four interfaces.
These interfaces are the LAN interface of the origin host’s gateway (CC LAN), the WAN
interface of the origin host’s gateway (CC WAN), remote WAN (SS WAN), and remote
LAN (SS LAN). It is logical to perform each of the four address translations at a different
interface. As such, the final implementation strategy involves the following operations:
1. Packet transmitted by origin host
2. SNAT translation at the CC LAN interface to obfuscate the datagram’s source address
3. Routing decision at the CC Gateway
4. DNAT translation at the CC WAN interface to obfuscate the datagram’s destination
address
5. Packet transits across the WAN
6. DNAT translation at the SS WAN interface to deobfuscate the source address
7. Routing decision at the SS Gateway
8. SNAT translation at the CC LAN interface to deobfuscate the source address
9. Packet arrives at destination host with no apparent modification
This implementation only requires trivial modification of packets – static, stateless trans-
lation of the source and destination fields in the IP datagram header. However, this require-
ment is not trivial to implement on the Linux operating system, as stateless NAT is not a
typical requirement of networking systems. It is usually desirable to keep the addressing
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of a connection stable throughout the duration of a connection. The widely-used IPTables
utility manipulates the Linux netfilter, which heavily utilizes conntrack to perform stateful
operations, especially with regards to address translation [13].
Implementation was done using the Traffic Control utility (tc), which manipulates the
Linux packet scheduler. The packet scheduler provides active queuing management (AQM)
for the packet queuing structures called ”qdiscs” (queuing disciplines). Queuing disciplines
can be attached to the ingress of an interface, or in a tree-like structure to handle and
process outbound packets. Queuing disciplines can perform filter-based actions on packets,
including stateless address translation [11]. As such, the tc utilitiy was chosen as a mech-
anism for implementing this MTD scheme on Linux gateways.
The implementation is done using a Python script on each gateway. The script is re-
sponsible for maintaining a time-synchronized mapping of the “real” IP to the obfuscated
address, as determined by the synchronization algorithm described below. The tc utility is
used by the script to create ”qdiscs” attached at appropriate points to each interface of the
gateway (a ”qdisc” for both inbound and outbound packets is required on each interface).
The tc utility is also used to apply the appropriate translations to each interface. These
translation filters are replaced near-atomically [11] as MTD intervals elapse.
Figure 8 illustrates the interaction between the DNAT/SNAT rules and the tc schedul-
ing rules.
4.3 MTD Protocol Handshake
The selected MTD algorithm, as proposed and demonstrated in Pappa, et al. is imple-
mented through a handshake consisting of three steps [1]. First, upon initialization of the
22
Figure 4.3 Packet manipulations by queuing discipline filters
MTD on the gateways, a seed is chosen. Next, a random list of IP addresses is generated by
each gateway. Third, the gateways begin the IP-hopping process according to the chosen
time interval. To ensure they perform IP-hopping simultaneously, when the gateways hop
to a new IP address, they use a simple synchronization. Once the list of IPs is exhausted,
this process is repeated from the first step with the selection of a seed and generation of a
random list of IP addresses. Figure 9 illustrates this process.
The first step of our MTD algorithm is the seeding process. In our current implementa-
tion, the seeding process is done in a simple manner. N, 24-bit network addresses have been
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Figure 4.4 Packet manipulations by queuing discipline filters
chosen, leaving eight bits for host addresses. 254 host addresses are appended to the each of
the N, 24-bit network addresses and they are added to a list. This gives a list of 254 * N IP
addresses. A random seed is then chosen and shared over an encrypted channel between the
gateways. In the second step this seed is used to shuﬄe this list. After the list is shuﬄed,
it is divided into two lists independently by each gateway. Each gateway now has the half
of the IP address list it will use and the list of the IP addresses the opposite gateway will
use. This is crucial to ensure that IP packets are encoded and decoded correctly by both
gateways.
The third step of the algorithm is to begin the MTD by setting the DNAT/SNAT rules
on each gateway according to the IP address lists. Synchronization of the gateways is ac-
complished by using a simple TCP connection. After both gateways have generated the
necessary IP address lists, they begin the MTD. Once the chosen time interval passes a
24
TCP socket is opened on each gateway and a TCP session is established. This session is
immediate dropped by both gateways and the SNAT/DNAT rules are updated to the next
entry in the IP address list. This process continues until the list of IP addresses has been
exhausted. At this point the final step is to choose a new seed and start from the first step
of the algorithm.
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This chapter analyzes the security and availability characteristics of our MTD algorithm
in a SCADA environment. The security benefits gained from our MTD implementation do
not effect the availability of SCADA communication.
5.1 Effects of MTD on SCADA Traffic Round-Trip Time
The first test measured the impact of the MTD implementation (and MTD hopping
interval) on the round-trip time of Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) transactions.
This test was performed using the defined testbed environment, with only idle/monitoring
SCADA traffic present on the network. The test was run for a span of five minutes, and
traffic was recorded. The test was performed with no MTD active, then repeated with active
MTD at intervals of 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 second. The results summarized represent the average
round-trip time (in milliseconds) between a DNP3 Read request and the corresponding
response. The time is measured beginning from when the Control Center Gateway LAN
interface first receives the request packet until the CC GW LAN interface transmits the
response packet.
Table 1 contains the resulting round-trip time (RTT) of this test. The results show a
slight increase of the RTT when an MTD of two to five seconds is used compared to the
baseline RTT. The RTT of the one second MTD is nearly double the RTT of the base-
line. Still, this is far below the DNP3 timeout value of 2000 ms and it is well within the
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Table 5.1 MTD Round Trip Time
acceptable range. From these results, we can conclude this MTD implementation is effi-
cient and produces little overhead in our test environment. This is important as we do not
want to create a situation in which a large amount of packets are dropped or re-transmitted.
5.2 Additional Traffic Due to MTD
The second test performed measures the network traffic on the link depending on the
presence and hopping interval of the Moving Target Defense. This test measures the network
activity (bytes per second) over time, and includes DNP3 traffic as well as overhead due
to MTD synchronization. The purpose of this test is to establish the additional amount of
network traffic due to overhead as well as retransmissions.
Table 5.2 MTD Total Traffic Utilization
An increasing trend can be observed as the MTD hopping interval becomes more fre-
quent. This is expected, as a more frequent hop demands more synchronization overhead, as
well as a greater likelihood of TCP segments dropping, which necessitates a retransmission.
However, the total network utilization is trivial given the capabilities of modern networking
systems, even at scale.
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5.3 Decreased Throughput Over a Saturated Link
The final test was performed to examine the impact of MTD on a saturated link. This
test was performed by timing the transfer of 10GB of test data between the two hosts. All
of the links are nominal 10Gbit Ethernet links, fully virtualized. The test was performed
using a single stream, and no disk IO was performed.
Table 5.3 Time for Transfer of 10GB
As can be seen, a high MTD hopping frequency can have a significant impact on the link
throughput near saturation. In the most demanding case examined (1s hopping interval),
MTD overhead accounts for over one sixth of the link throughput. However, this case is
expected of a SCADA environment, and even scaling up, the worst case throughput impact
is still tolerable for the requirements of a SCADA system.
5.4 Comparative Analysis of Performance Impact
Each paper provided an analysis regarding latency. In our example, we took the RTT of
our DNP3 traffic. We can compare this to the RTT of TCP acknowledgements provided by
each implementation. Looking at table 4 it can be seen the SDN implementations, CHAOS
and fingerprint hopping, create the largest latency. While these are large spikes in latency,
they are far from the time out value of DNP3 traffic. Unfortunately, these studies did not
provide any data related to throughput overhead. Regardless, from a performance perspec-
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Figure 5.1 Network traffic over time for various hopping intervals
tive, these solutions may be viable in a SCADA evironment.
RPAH and Proxy Hopping both outperform our implementation in regarding latency.
We could most likely reduce our latency by optimizing our codebase. We could also look
at alternate implementation methods such as modifying the Linux kernel or userspace
TCP/IP stack. This could however introduce unescessary security vulnerabilities. In terms
of throughput, our implementation has the best results with only a 5.95 percent overhead.
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5.5 Comparative Analysis of Security Impact
One main factor in determing the security benefits of an MTD, is determing the config-
uration space. The configuration space is the total possible number of obfuscated values an
MTD solution can produce. For example, in a class C network where 8 bits are available
for host assignment, there are 256 IP addresses. Two of those addresses cannot be assigned
because they are reserved for the network address and the broadcast address. This means
there are 254 IP addresses available. In the case of a network layer MTD such as ours,
using a class C address, the size of our configuration space is 254.
A logical hypothesis is an increase in the configuration space creates an increase in en-
tropy. This makes it more difficult for an attacker to guess the proper configurations to
footprint or address a host in an MTD. Another factor however, is the interval at which
hopping occurs. Pappa showed in [3] there is an exponetial relationship between the size
of the configuration space and the hopping interval. In our case, as the number of IP ad-
dresses in our configuration space increases for a certain hopping interval, the probabilty of
a successful attack decreases exponentially.
In the case of each of these papers, a successful attack was carried out if an attacker
scanned a network, found an IP address and executed an attack within the time window
of a single hop. The percentages shown in table 4 for the average success rate are the
percentages for how often an implementation prevented an attack. So you can see, our
implementation prevents attacks 85 percent of the time.
This is in line with the other implementations and could be improved by increasing our
hopping interval or our configuration space. Additionally, the results for fingerprint hopping
and CHAOS are somewhat dubious. Their results were taken under the assumption their
IDS detected all malicious traffic. This is not realistic.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a network layer MTD for SCADA systems utilizing stateless
address translation implemented with AQM and NAT rules. Our results show this method
is a promising, automated tool which provides security while meeting the critical availabil-
ity requirements for SCADA networks. The results of our testing have been positive. Still,
additional work is needed to both thoroughly test this method and develop a useful industry
security tool.
Future work will focus on expanding the MTD capabilities to provide complete cryp-
tographically random and secure distribution of the seeding process. Additionally, a more
robust handshaking method must be developed. The implementation of a port hopping
scheme in conjunction with the IP-hopping MTD could provide additional entropy in the
system. This would increase the security benefits of the MTD.
Another challenge is expanding the tool to be used as a scalable distributed system.
Error correction methods are one design feature that must be implemented and refined to
make this a reality. A standardized evaluation criteria should be developed for the purpose
of testing the effectiveness of this and future network layer MTD tools. Specifically, tests
should be developed to determine the security benefits and effects on availability of future
solutions.
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